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STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I - Plaintiff-Appellant's Cause of Action is barred by the
statute of limitations because it is for a liability created by the statutes of
this state, and the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 7812-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, applies.
POINT II - Even if the Six-year statute of limitations applies,
Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action is barred because more than six years
expired between the date any cause of action accrued in the PlaintiffAppellant and the date the action thereon was commenced.
POINT III - The Fourth District Court properly dismissed the action
as Plaintiff was never evicted.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------------------T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN,
Plain tiff-A ppe llan t,
vs.

Case No. 15751

UT AH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY,
a corporation, and UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD, a
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.
-~-----------------------------------------------------------------

NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action for damages for the alleged breach of the
covenants under a Special Warranty Deed.

DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT
The Defendant-Respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Company (hereafter
referred to as Defendant-Respondent) moved to dismiss the action. This
Motion to Dismiss was treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment of No
Cause of Action.

The District Court granted said Motion, and Plaintiff-

Appellant appealed the judgment of the District Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the
District Court.

-1-
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-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 8, 1945, the Plaintiff-Appellant purchased from
the Defendant-Respondent a parcel of real property situated in Utah County,
State of Utah, by Special Warranty Deed.

(Affidavit of Plaintiff dated

August 5, 1977, paragraph 5). The total purchase price of the parcel was
$700.00, which represented the fair market value of the property.

(Affi-

davit of John Wunderli, (hereafter Wunderli Affidavit), dated January 6,
1978, paragraphs 3 and 14, Deposition of Plaintiff dated March 14, 1977,
page 15, lines 1 through 4,) The Defendant-Respondent provided the
Plaintiff in 1945 with an abstract of title, which abstract did not indicate
th-:_existence of any ~nt on the property in favor of the Defendant
Union Pacific Railroad Com an

Affidavit of Plaintiff dated August 5,

'~

1977, paragraph 10, Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph
5.)
Following his purchase of said property, Plaintiff-Appellant
mortgaged the property on several occasions for varying amounts of money.
(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 5,) The last said
mortgage was given in 1965 to Dean Terry and Vilate Terry, his wife.
(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 10, 5.)
On August 25, 1916, the Defendant-Respondent had given an easement
to the San Pedro, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake Railroad Company Corporation
for purposes of a spur railroad track.

(Wunderli Affidavit dated January

6, 1978, paragraph 6.) This easement was subsequently acquired by the

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company.

Because of an inadequate

description of the easement in the original deed, the location of the easemer
is not ascertainable in the records of the Utah County Recorder's Office,

,

(Wunderli Affidavit, dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 6.)
On September 16, 1956, Plaintiff-Appellant leased from the Los
Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad a triangular piece of property adjoining the
subject property on the south.

There was attached to that lease as Exhibit

A a plat showing the property leased.

On that plat there is shown a spur

track number 6 which parallels and bounds the east boundary line of the
subject property.

Shown to the west on the plat outline is a double line in

the middle of which appear the words "spur track (abandoned)." Since
September 16, 1946, up to the present time, Plaintiff-Appellant has been
aware of the fact that there was an easement which was designated as
abandoned

by the railroad extending through the subject property.

(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 7.) Plaintiff had
knowledge at the time of his purchase that there had been a spur track local1

on the property.

(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 11.I

Plaintiff-Appellant has never been evicted from the subject property
by reason of the purported spur track easement in favor of the railroad.
(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 8.) In fact, in or

about 1948, Plaintiff-Appellant caused a large building to be constructed
directly over the purported easement.

(Wunderli Affidavit, dated January
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7.) The railroad at no time has ever complained or made any issue about
Plaintiff-Appellant's use of the property, nor has it ever asserted any
rights in connection with the spur track easement.

(Wunderli Affidavit

dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 9.)
In 1970 and 1971, Plaintiff-Appellant suffered a major setback in
the operation of his business due to the theft of equipment.

(Deposition of

Plaintiff dated March 14, 1977, p. 32, lines 21 and 22.) This led to the
failure of his business, and in the years 1971 through 1975, PlaintiffAppellant had no income.

(Deposition of Plaintiff dated March 14, 1977, p.

32 lines 12-20.)
Plaintiff-Appellant claims that on March 13, 1973, he learned of
the purported railroad spur easement for the first time.

(Plaintiff's

Affidavit dated August 5, 1977, paragraph 6.) However, in Plaintiff's
Affidavit, paragraph 13, Plaintiff-Appellant states of a conversation with
Defendant's Mr. Bigler on May 6, 1971, with respect to the spur track
easement.

He entered into negotiations with the Defendant Union Pacific

Railroad Company to obtain a quit claim deed for the easement upon his
payment to the railroad of $100. 00.

(Plaintiff's Affidavit dated August 5,

1977, paragraph 15), but this transaction was never completed.

(Plaintiff's

Affidavit dated August 5, 1977, paragraph 20.)
Due to the failure of his business, Plaintiff was unable to make the
mortgage payments on the subject property (Wunderli Affidavit dated January
6, 1978, paragraph 12), and on March 10, 1975, Dean Terry and Vilate
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Terry, holders of the mortgage, obtained a judgment and decree of
foreclosure of the mortgage.

The property was sold at public auction and

the Plaintiff-Appellant failed to redeem the property.

(Wunderli Affidavit

dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 10.)
At no time prior to the filing of this action did Plaintiff-Appellant
ask said Defendant-Respondent to remedy and secure a release of the
easement.

(Deposition of Plaintiff, dated March 14, 1977, p. 33 lines

12-24, p. 73 line 10 through p. 75 line 16; Wunderli Affidavit dated
January 6, 1978, paragraph 13.) Instead, after Plaintiff-Appellant's
mortgage was foreclosed for failure to make mortgage payments as
required, he filed this action against the Defendant-Respondent to recover
damages in excess of $400, 000. 00 he allegedly suffered as a result of the
abandoned easement.

(Prayer of Amended Complaint.)

ARGUMENT

I.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 1 S CA USE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE IT IS FOR A LIABILITY CREATED
BY THE STATUTES OF THIS STATE, AND THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, APPLIES.
This is an action to charge Defendant-Respondent with liability for
breach of the covenants of title.

Covenants of title applicable in Utah are

set forth in § 57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and
accordingly, Plaintiff-Appellant's Cause of Action is for a liability created
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by the statutes of this state.

Section 78-12-26 (4), Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended, provides that
An action for a liability created by the statutes of
this state, other than a penalty or forfeiture under
the laws of this state, except where in special
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the
statutes of this state ••
must be brought within three years.

Actions on covenants of title are not

a "special case" in which a different statute of limitations is prescribed by
statute, and the general provision set forth above should apply. PlaintiffAppellant contends that the six-year statute of limitations for liabilities
founded upon a written instrument should apply.

Such a view overlooks the

fact that the writing involved in this case does not set forth any of the
specific warranties found in the statute.

It merely contains a covenant

that grantor "has not done or committed any act or thing whereby the said
premises now are or at any time hereafter shall be impeached, charged,
or encumbered in any manner whatsoever." (Special Warranty Deed from
Defendant-Respondent to Plaintiff-Appellant dated June 8, 1945,) Only by
referring to the statute may the five specific covenants referred to in
Plaintiff-Appellant's brief be found.

Plaintiff-Appellant's claim is founded

on the statute, not on the writing, and the shorter statute of limitations
should apply.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has applied the six-year statute
of limitations to a case involving breach of covenants of title, there is no
indication in that opinion that the issue of the applicable statute of
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limitations was ever raised.
( 1935).

Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah 485, 46 p 2d. 4n

Since actions on covenants of title in Utah are grounded upon

statutory provisions, it would appear that the three-year statute of limita· ,
tions would be by its terms more applicable.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to PlaintiffAppellant, his own statement of the facts in his brief indicates that more
than three years expired between March 13, 1973, the date PlaintiffAppellant claims the cause of action arose, and November 11, 1976, the
date he filed this lawsuit.

Thus, Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action is

barred by the applicable statute of limitations even on his own statement of

I
facts.

II.
EVEN IF THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BECAUSE
MORE THAN SIX YEARS EXPIRED BETWEEN THE DATE ANY CAUSE OF
ACTION ACCRUED IN THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE DATE
THE ACTION THEREON WAS COMMENCED.
The material facts in this case are not disputed, and based upon
the undisputed facts, the District Court properly held that as a matter of
law Plaintiff-Appellant is not entitled to recover.

The facts show that

Plaintiff-Appellant's only cause of action arose at the time of the conveyanci
I

of the property, in 1945, and that this action is barred even by the six-year
statute of limitations.
As the basis for his claim against the Defendant-Respondent,
Plaintiff-Appellant has alleged that the Defendant-Res pond ent "breached its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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warranties to convey fee title to the Plaintiff." (Amended Complaint,
paragraph 8.) He further alleges that Defendant-Respondent breached the
"warranties of title and covenants expressed or implied in the Special
Warranty Deed." (Amended Complaint, paragraph 20.) There is no
clarification in the amended complaint as to what specific covenants
Plaintiff-Appellant alleges were breached, so this brief will respond as
if it had been alleged that Defendant-Respondent had breached all of the
warranties expressed or implied in the Special Warranty Deed.
Section 57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, sets
forth the five statutory covenants that a properly executed Warranty Deed
is deemed to include.

Under this statute, grantor covenants as follows:

1.

That he is lawfully seised of the premises,

2.

That he has good right to convey the same,

3.

That he guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and assigns
the quiet possession thereof,

4.

That the premises are free from all encumbrances, and

5.

That the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the
grantee, his heirs, and assigns against all lawful claims
whatsoever.

A Special Warranty Deed includes each of these covenants, except that
grantor only covenants that he himself has done nothing to breach them.
In analyzing a case in which a breach of any or all of these covenants
is alleged, it is important to bear in mind that the law does not treat each of
these covenants the same, and the legal principles applicable to one
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covenant may have no bearing upon another covenant. It is essential, in
studying the case law regarding such covenants, to determine which of the
covenants a case is dealing with so as to avoid the misapplication of important legal principles.

For example, legal principles regarding the

covenant of seisin should not necessarily be applied to the covenant of
warranty.
In order to simplify the discussion, each of the covenants which
Defendant-Respondent has allegedly breached will be discussed separately.
Covenant of Seisin.
The covenant of seisin is a covenant that grantor owns the estate or
interest he purports to convey.

It is breached if the grantor does not own

the estate or interest he purports to convey.

No actual eviction of grantee

is required.
The majority rule, with which we are in accord, is that
there is a breach of warranty when it is shown that the
grantor did not own the land that he purported to convey
by warranty deed description. The covenants involved
are of seisin and of good right to convey the property
which for the purposes considered in this case, are
synonymous, and the breach thereof is made out by a
showing that those rights did not exist in the grantor,
and it is not necessary to show an actual eviction or
threat thereof. Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305,
470 P 2d. 403 (1970). (Emphasis added.)
A breach of this covenant occurs at the time of conveyance, if at all, for
the grantor either has seisin or he does not have seisin at the time he

i

I

makes the covenant.

Bernklauv. Stephens, 150Colo. 187, 371P. 2d765,
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The cause of action for breach of the covenant of seisin arises at
the time the deed is given.

Anderson v. Larson, 177 Minn. 606, 225 N. w.

902 (1929); Faller vs. Davis, 30 Okl. 56, 118 P. 382 (1911), cited with
approval in Creason

Vo

Peterson. Therefore, the statute of limitations

starts running against the grantee in a case involving the covenant of seisin
upon the date of conveyance. If Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that said
Defendant breached the covenant of seisin, his claim is clearly barred under
even the six-year statute of limitations.
It should be noted that Creason v. Peterson, which is cited by

Plaintiff-Appellant in support of its position that an actual eviction need
not be alleged to permit recovery for breach of the covenant of warranty,
deals with a breach of the covenants of seisin and right to convey. The
holding in Creason is not applicable to covenant of warranty cases. The
opinion expressly states "The covenants involved are of seisin and of
good right to convey the property." Although the opinion does use the word
"warranty" in defining what constitutes a breach of the covenant of seisin,
it appears that the court was using the word "warranty" as a synonym for

the word "covenant." This becomes even more clear upon noting that it is
the very next sentence that states that the covenants involved in that case
were those of seisin and right to convey.
Covenant of Right to Convey.
This covenant is that grantor has the power to convey the property
described in the deed.

It is very similar to the covenant of seisin and the
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Utah Supreme Court treated it as synonymous with the covenant of seisin in
the case of Creason v. Peterson.

Accordingly, this covenant was breached,

if at all, at the time of the conveyance, and any claim Plaintiff-Appellant
has thereon is barred by the statute of limitations.
Covenant against Encumbrances.
This covenant is one against encumbrances upon the property, such
as liens, mortgages, and easements.

The existence of an encumbrance

upon the property is a breach of this covenant.

The primary question

before the courts regarding this covenant has been, When does a cause of
action accrue for breach of the covenant against encumbrances? Soderberg
v. Holt, supra. The Soderberg case sets forth a detailed discussion of the
various judicial positions on this issue, which is summarized herein. The
opinion states that traditionally the covenant against encumbrances was
treated similarly to those of seisin and right to convey.

A cause of action

for breach of the covenant against encumbrances arose al the time of the
conveyance, for the reason that either there was an encumbrance at the
time of conveyance or there was not.

Later, some jurisdictions revised

this rule, holding that the cause of action did not arise until the grantee
suffered damages as a result of the encumbrance.

This revised position

was intended to protect grantees who were not made aware of the encumbrance until long after the statute of limitations had expired.

These courts

viewed the covenant solely as one of indemnity, giving the grantee the right
to recover from the grantor any sums grantee had to pay as a result of the
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encumbrance.
This revised rule corrected an injustice, in that parties who were
required to extinguish encumbrances such as liens and mortgages were
allowed to be indemnified by their grantor at the time they were really
damaged, that is, upon their being damnified.

Unfortunately, this revised

rule created a new injustice, in that it virtually denied grantors the protection of the statute of limitations in cases where the encumbrance was not
a monetary charge on the land that could be extinguished, but was a permanent burden on the title, such as an easement.

Such encumbrances were

generally not capable of being removed by payment of a charge, but were of
a type that permanently reduced the value of the property, with the loss, if
any, occurring at the time of conveyance and not later, as L'1 the case of
monetary charges.
Judge Cooley in Post v. Campau, 42 Mich. 90, 3 N. W. 272, 275
(1879) drew this distinction between the two types of encumbrances, creating
a new rule, and the Utah Supreme Court in Soderberg cited his opinion with
strong approval and adopted his view.

The Utah court felt that where an

encumbrance not involving a money charge exists, the covenant is breached
and the cause of action arises at the time of conveyance, because that is
the best time to determine the damage suffered by the grantee, consisting
of loss in value of the property.

The protection of the statute of limitations

is accorded to the grantor commencing with the date of the conveyance.
Explaining its position, the Utah Court held:
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In a very able opinion, Mr. Justice Cooley drew a
distinction between encumbrances which were permanent and which were burdens upon the title, such
as an easement • • • and those encumbrances, such
as liens, which were capable of beL'lg removed at
the option of the covenantee. The former kind, Judge
Cooley suggested, permanently reduced the value of
the title conveyed and thus could be ascertained as
much at the time of the conveyance as at any future
time, and that therefore it was reasonable to hold
that a covenant against them was broken at once and
finally, because the covenantee could proceed at
once to recover full damages ••• "It is only by thus
distinguishing between encumbrances that the covenant
can have reasonable effect in all cases ••• 11 We
believe that the logical fabric and the law will be
better maintained and yet justice be done by holding
that a covenant against encumbrances is, in effect,
a covenant to indemnify where the encumbrance is a
charge or lien against the land which can be extinguished
by payment. Thus the statute can be held to begin to
run only when the grantee is damnified. (Emphasis
added.)
Later in the opinion, the court discusses the similarity of circumstances in cases where the covenant of seisin is breached and in cases
where an encumbrance exists which is not a money charge on the land. In
each situation a nondischargeable encumbrance exists which permanently
affects the title.

The court states further "in such cases there is no

reason why the statute [of limitations) should not be set in motion immediate!\
when the covenant is broken, because the damages for the wrong may be
then as completely and fully adjudged as at any other time.
The Soderberg rule remains the law in Utah.

11

Thus in cases involvinr 1
I

a money charge on property, the statute of limitations does not commence

i

until the grantee pays that charge to remove the encumbrance. But in cases'.
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like the one at bar, where the encumbrance is an easement, not involving a
money charge, the statute of limitations commences at the time of conveyanc''• If an action is timely commenced, the Plaintiff may recover the
difference in value between the property with the encumbrance and without
the encumbrance.

If the action is not timely commenced, as occured in this

case, it is barred.

Plaintiff-Appellant's citation of Soderberg as holding

that the covenant against encumbrances is solely a covenant to indemnify
misstates the court's holding and overlooks the above distinction between
types of encumbrances.

The language in SodE:rberg stating that the statute

of limitations begins to run only when the grantee is damnified expressly
applies only "where the encumbrance is a charge or lien against the land
which can be extinguished by payment." No such monetary encumbrance
existed in our case.
Also, since the deed to the easement was recorded in 1916, the
public records imparted constructive notice to the Plaintiff-Appellant of
the existence of the easement, and it becomes even more just to hold that
his cause of action arose at the time of the conveyance.

Ruthrauff v. Silver

King Western Min. & Mill. Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P 2d 338 (1938). The
statute of limitations commenced in 1945, and expired long before PlaintiffAppellant filed suit.

Any claim of Plaintiff-Appellant based on the covenant

against encumbrances is barred, and the District Court held properly in
granting summary judgment for the Defendant-TI espondent.
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Covenants of Quiet Enjoyment and Warranty.
The covenant for quiet enjoyment is that grantee will not be disturb,;
in his possession or enjoyment of the property by a third party's lawful
claim of title.

The covenant of warranty is that grantor guarantees the

soundness of title, and agrees to defend on behalf of the grantee any paramount claims existing at the date of conveyance.

For all practical purposes,

these two covenants amount to the same thing, and because the same rules
apply to each, they are discussed here together.

East Canyon Land and

Stock Company vs. Davis and Weber Counties Canal Company, 65 Utah 560,
238 P. 280 (1925); Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 (1924). lt
is true that these covenants are not necessarily breached at the time of
conveyance. It is also true that these covenants run with the land, although
this does not become important in this case because there have been no

\

subsequent grantees; the original covenantors are the parties to this suit.
The important point with respect to these covenants in this case is
that even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to PlaintiffAppellant, these covenants were not breached by the Defendant-Respondent.
Therefore, no cause of action ever arose for Plaintiff-Appellant on these
two covenants.
The covenants for quiet enjoyment and warranty are breached, and
a cause of action accrues in the grantee, if the grantee is ( 1) evicted (2) by
one having paramount title.
The general rule is to the effect that where one seeks
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to recover for a breach of the covenants of warrant
of title, he must allege an eviction by one having y
paramount or better title. East Canyon Land & Stock
Company v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Company,
supra.
The Utah Supreme Court has further stated that the covenant of
warranty is a "warranty against eviction only." VanCott v. Jacklin, supra,
citingTallmadgev. Wallis, 25Wend. (N.Y.) 115. Therefore, as a general
rule, Utah law requires that there be an eviction of a grantee by someone
having paramount title before a cause of action arises for breach of these
covenants.
It seems implicit in the above statement of the rule that, at least in

the case of Special Warranty Deeds, that paramount title in the evicting
party must have been in existence at the time of conveyance to the grantee,
for two reasons.

First, the grantor in a Special Warranty Deed covenants

only that he will warrant and defend his grantee's title and quiet enjoyment
against the lawful claims that were created by soffi2 act of his.

He does not

promise to protect against lawful claims arising subsequent to his conveyance.
Second, it would be inherently unjust to require a grantor to protect his
grantee against claims arising as a result of grantee's actions and not
through any acts of the grantor, after grantor had conveyed the property,
Accordingly, a grantee has no cause of action against his grantor on the
covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment if he either is not evicted from
the property, or if he is evicted but by someone claiming paramount title
whose claim arose after the conveyance of the property.

This view is
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supported in a case cited in Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, which statc·s that:
No cause of action arises upon the covenant of
warranty • • . until after eviction, either actual or
constructive, by one having an adverse or paramount
title which existed when the covenant was made.
Wilder v. Wilhite, 190 Kan. 564, 376 P. 2d 797 (1962).

I
I

In the present case, Plaintiff-Appellant has no cause of action on the
covenants of warranty or quiet enjoyment because he was never evicted
from the property.

,

He alleges in paragraph 10 of his Amended Complaint th,I

he was evicted "due to the fact that he was prevented from either mortgaging I
or selling said property, and that said property was lost in a foreclosure
action." This allegation does not state a valid cause of action, as the
District Court properly held.
from the subject property.

The Plaintiff-Appellant was never evicted

Rather, his interest was foreclosed by a third

party to whom he had mortgaged the property in 1963, eighteen years after
the conveyance of the property to him.

The property was sold to satisfy

the judgment of foreclosure, and Plaintiff-Appellant failed to redeem the
property after the judgment sale.

He was not evicted.

Furthermore, even if this court should hold that foreclosure of a
mortgage and subsequent sale of the mortgaged property constitutes an
eviction by the mortgagee of the mortgagor, Plaintiff-Appellant still has no
cause of action on the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment against
Defendant-Respondent.

This is because he was not "evicted" by someone

holding paramount title who held such title at the time of conveyance. If

Defendant
Company
sought
to enforce
Sponsored by the
the S.J.
Quinney LawUnion
Library. Pacific
Funding forRailroad
digitization provided
by thehad
Institute
of Museum
and Libraryits
Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

rights as easement holder and had required Plaintiff-Appellant to remove his
building from the right of way, Plaintiff-Appellant might have a colorable
claim.

Even at that, such an

11

eviction

11

would only be partial. The

Plaintiff-Appellant doesn't allege this, and the facts show that the railroad
had for all intents and purposes abandoned the easement.

Plaintiff-

Appellant alleges only that he was foreclosed upon by his own mortgagee.
Defendant-Respondent had nothing to do with the creation of the mortgage
and should not be required to be responsible for Plaintiff-Appellant's
failure to keep up his mortgage payments.

In cases involving an alleged

breach of the covenant against encumbrances, Utah law clearly provides
that a grantor cannot recover damages for breach of the covenant by his
grantors unless those damages were in fact caused by the breach of that
covenant.

Damages resulting from some other cause are not recoverable.

Pacific Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Rohn, 101 Utah 335, 121 P 2d 635 (1942).
It would appear that the same rule should apply in cases involving alleged

breaches of the covenants of warrants and of quiet enjoyment.
The only effect that Plaintiff-Appellant alleges directly resulted
from the existence of the easement was that he was unable to sell or mortgage the property.

Even if this were true, it does not allege a breach of

the covenants of warranty or quiet enjoyment.

The law does not require a

granter to covenant in a Special Warranty deed that his grantee will later
be able to sell the property.

It only requires him to covenant that the grantee

will not be evicted from the property by a paramount claim. V arCott v.
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Jacklin, supra, East Canyon Land & Stock Company v. David & WebcE_
Counties Canal Company, supra. The cause of the Plaintiff-Appellant's
loss through foreclosure of the property was his failure to make the
required mortgage payments.
tence of the easement.

The foreclosure was not caused by the exis-.

Since Plaintiff-Appellant has not alleged and the

facts before the Court do not show an eviction of the Plaintiff-Appellant by
one holding paramount title, no cause of action for breach of these warranties ever arose in the Plaintiff-Appellant.

III.
THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE
ACTION AS PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER EVICTED.
Plaintiff-Appellant states in his brief that Utah law does not require
an allegation of actual eviction to state a cause of action for breach of
these covenants.

He cites the case of East Canyon Land & Stock Company

v. David & Weber Counties Canal Company, and selectively quotes language I
in the opinion to support his view.

The East Canyon case is clearly dis-

tinguished from this action and the language quoted is inapplicable to the
facts of this case.

In East Canyon, the grantor deeded property by mesne

conveyances to the ultimate grantee by warranty deed.

It was discovered

that the grantor had not owned the land, but that title thereto was in the
sovereign, the United States.

Plaintiff sued for breach of the covenant of

warranty, but did not allege an actual eviction.
complaint.

Defendant demurred to the

The Court first clearly stated, as was discussed above, that thi

general
rule
that Funding
an eviction
by one
having
titleand
must
beServices
allegr
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in order lo state a valid cause of action for breach of the covenants of
warrants and quiet enjoyment.

It then cited two main exceptions to the rule.

First, \!/here title is in the sovereign (as occurred in that case), an actual
eviction need not be alleged. The language quoted by Plaintiff-Appellant is
the language of this exception to the general rule.

Plaintiff-Appellant's

statement on page 9 of his brief that the language he quotes "sets forth what
allegations are sufficient in a breach of covenants action," misstates the
law and makes the exception into the general rule. This exception, on its
facts, docs not apply in the present case, where paramount title is not in the
sovereign.
The second exception is that where a paramount title is asserted so
that grantee must either yield to it by leasing or purchasing the land, or
else be evicted, no actual eviction need be pleaded if the grantee chose to
purchase or lease the property rather than be evicted.

This exception does

not apply to the present case either, because the purported paramount title
holder, the Defendant railroad company, never sought to "evict" the PlaintiffAppellant, and Plaintiff-Appellant never was put in the position of choosing
between eviction or paying off the railroad.
Plaintiff-Appellant also cites the case of Creason vs. Peterson,
supra, in support of his claim that no actual eviction was required.

As was

discussed above, Creason dealt expressly with the covenants of seisin and
right to convey, where eviction is not required.

Its language is not applicable

to cases involving breach of the covenant of warranty.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

Plaintiff-Appellant further cites the Kansas case of Wilder vs.
Wilhite, in support of his claim that no actual eviction was required. Tht
Wilder case does not support Plaintiff-Appellant's argument.

That case

states with clarity, in language quoted above, the rule that an eviction is
required to support a cause of action for breach of the covenant of warranty,
No actual eviction was alleged in Wilder, but the Petition did allege that
grantee had been required to engage in "extensive litigation" with a third
party who held paramount title.

The court felt that this allegation was

sufficient to allege a constructive eviction and withstand a demurrer. The

1

case at bar is distinguishable on its facts from Wilder, because the only
purported holder of paramount title, the railroad company, has made no
issue of the easement and has never sought to enforce it against PlaintiffAppellant.

There has been no litigation whatsoever between Plaintiff-

Appellant and the railroad over the railroad's right to the easement. It
should be noted that the court liberally construed the Plaintiff's pleading in
Wilder, because its sufficiency had never been challenged by the Defendant
on motion, and this fact affected the court's decision.

In the present case,
1

Plaintiff-Appellant has filed both a Complaint and an Amended Complaint,

i

neither of which state a cause of action, and he should not be entitled to any
such liberal treatment.

This view is supported in Faller v. Davis, supra,

cited approvingly in Creason v. Peterson.
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cause of action could arise in Plaintiff-Appellant for breach of the covenants
of warranty and quiet enjoyment.

CONCLUSION
Because any claim that Plaintiff-Appellant may have had for breach
of the covenants of seisin, right to convey, or against encumbrances is
barred by even the six-year Statute of Limitations, and because no cause
of action ever arose in the Plaintiff-Appellant for the breach of the covenants
of warranty and quiet enjoyment, the District Court ruled properly in
dismissing the Complaint. The Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests
that the decision of the District Court be affirmed on this appeal.

Respectively Submitted
McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE

By~~~~-=-=~:---:-;-.,.--~~~~~~
Wilford M. Burton

Blaine R. Ferguson
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent UtahIdaho Sugar Company (U & I, Inc.)
500 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: 521-4135

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

